I have got some interesting questions from Emanuel Bria, a Whiteheadian from East Timor ;-), in regards with my previous posting “Welcoming the Nothingness”. They are so intriguing that I decided to put the answers in a new posting.
I never really think of comparing Heidegger with Whitehead. So I am not sure if I could answer the questions correctly because first of all I don’t know much about Whitehead’s thoughts. Secondly, I am still very much confused about Heidegger’s thoughts. Thus, answering these questions is like walking in the dark … marching into the realm of Nothingness ;-) …
1. The idea of lethe as a "movement", reminds me to Whiteheadian "Creativity". It has no ontological status but "there is" (quite paradoxal isn't it?). For a thing to exist two conditions are necessary (1) Physical pole; (2) conceptual one. And "Creativity" has neither of them. How about this Heideggerian "lethe"?
Lethe = creativity? Well, let’s see what Whitehead said in Process and Reality about creativity: "It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity. . . . The many become one, and are increased by one."
The catch is on the word “creativity” which suggests a process of creation. I have some questions about this. What is this "complex unity"? Is it something different and new from the “many”? Are the many and the one are of the same genus? What is the relationship between Creativity as the ultimate principle on the one hand and the many and the one on the other hand? I am not clear either with what “there is” here means and whether we could compare it with Heidegger's explanation about Being as “there is” in On Time and Being.
Meanwhile, Heidegger described lethe as a horizon from which things/beings emerge and to which beings rest. So it does not create beings or make it appear. It is actually Ereignis that allows beings to appear within our field of vision (see Discourse on Thought). This Ereignis appropriates Being and beings to their own most. If lethe then appears as a “movement”, it is, in my opinion, because of this Ereignis.
So, can Ereignis be associated with Whiteheadian Creativity then? I am not sure because Ereignis does not create something new, as the one come from the many as in Whitehead’s thoughts. It simply appropriates (Being and beings). Unfortunately there is not much can be derived from Ereignis except that it appropriates. This is so typical Heidegger to say of something as if it was already very clear while it is actually not ;-). But let’s say we accept what he said about that for the sake of argument. In From Enownment, Contribution to Philosophy, he said Ereignis is actually Being that holds sway. To compare it with Whitehead's thoughts, we need to be clear about the nature of Creativity and its relationship to the one and the many.
What Ereignis appropriates is the so-called belonging-together (Zusammengehörigkeit) of Being and beings. Being and beings are not the same, not of the same genus obviously if we could even say that, but they belong together. Between Being and beings there stands this famous ontological difference that forever cannot be bridged. In contrast, the one in Whitehead's thoughts comes from the many.
2. From your example about the shift in perspective of the idea of Being, can we say that "lethe" is similar to the moment of unknowness? If yes, then the category applies here is epistemological rather than ontological. Am I right?
If it is asked how we know that lethe “exists”, then yes it might be an epistemological issue in a sense that we know something is never fully disclosed when it "appears" differently throughout history. But this is where the importance of time in Heidegger’s thoughts sets in. It has got to do with the meaning of Being as presencing with temporal character as opposed to presence which is traditionally understood as something ever-present, constant, unchanging. Being discloses itself (or we can say Being gives itself) in an epochal way. By saying this Heidegger was injecting a sense of historicity to the meaning of Being.
Therefore, it is not simply an epistemological category because (at one point of time) there is no telling about what there is to know or yet to know or whether we could know it or not. Being is hidden not because we have or do not have knowledge about it but because it is the way Being discloses itself. It discloses itself in history which Heidegger called the history of Being. This way, Heidegger is saying goodbye to the never-changing, absolute, Idea of Plato.
This is as far as I understand ... or misunderstood ;-)
4 comments:
In regards with complex unity:
“complex unity” in a sense similar to “many” but not in a form of “repetition” yet “creative advance”, means the complex unity formed by the ultimate principle (Creativity) will in turn become “many” in its transformed form (objective data) for the next process of forming the future “complex unity”. Creativity is the “elan vital” of this process of growing.
By “one” Whitehead refers to one actual entity / occasion, whereas “many” refers to objective data / past / environment / society where “one” exists and also to “pure potentialities” (eternal objects). The shift from “many” to “one” occurs when “one” defines / creates itself out of the composition of “many”. Once “one” cuts itself off from “many” it in turn becomes part of “many” for other “ones” - becomes data for others to grow as well. Principle of cosmic solidarity lies in this process.
In regards with historicity:
Heideggerian Being is quiet similar to that of Whiteheadian God in a sense that tempus is factored in. Being is therefore historical as Whiteheadian God in its “consequent nature”. By this Heidegger and Whitehead arrive at the same conclusion by saying “sayonara” to never-changing, absolute, Idea of Plato.
Eman, thanks for the explanation about complex unity.
So both philosophers are trying to "escape" from the same thing. I will look into Whitehead's main ideas again on this. Just be careful with the historicity, the temporal aspect of Being, in Heidegger's thought. It shouldn't be understood as the progressive unconcealment of Being.
rp
So how should we understand "the unconcealment of Being", if not in the sense of "progressive"? If merely, as your last posting, an appropriation, then what makes Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics different from that of Schleiermacher and Dilthey? Per mea culpa, I don't really read Heidegger works as deeply and widely as you. So no wonder if so many questions come up to my mind.
This is what Heidegger says about the History of Being: “The history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sending and the It which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation. To hold back is, in Greek, epoche. Hence we speak the epochs of the destiny of Being. Epoch does not mean here a span of time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental characteristic of sending, the actual holding-back of itself in favor of the discernibility of the gift, that is, of Being with regard to the grounding of beings. The sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is not accidental, nor can it be calculated as necessary” [OTB, 9].
How is it different from Schleiermacher and Dilthey? Both philosophers focus on the understanding human being. Perhaps they are closer to early Heidegger than to later Heidegger that somehow closes the possibility of man’s efforts to disclose Being by asking questions or understanding.
Schleiermacher focuses on the art of the understanding and more on the psychological conditions of dialogue. And Dilthey understands historicity in terms of the intrinsic temporality of understanding: meaning always stands in a horizonal context that stretches into the past and into the future. It is more of an epistemological term. As shown by Palmer in Hermeneutics Dilthey defines history as “ultimately a series of world views” [Palmer, 1969].
Post a Comment